ABSTRACT
Introduction
The 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU extended the freedom of movement to workers from twelve new member states mainly from Central and Eastern Europe. 1 The ensuing migration generally proved to be a positive experience for European Union and the pre-enlargement fears from free labor mobility of new EU citizens turned out unjustified. No economically significant detrimental effects on the receiving countries' labor markets have been documented, nor has there been any evidence for statistically significant welfare shopping. 2 Rather, there appear to have been positive effects on EU's productivity. 3 The sending countries face some risks of losing their young and skilled labor force, but free labor mobility has relieved them of some redundant labor and the associated fiscal burden during the recession of the late 2000s and early 2010s. They have also profited from remittances, and the experience gained abroad proves useful upon return. 4 The severe economic slowdown of the late 2000s and early 2010s, also dubbed the Great Recession, abruptly changed the migration landscape in Europe. The youth has disproportionally borne the economic adversities caused by the economic shocks that 1 Including Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004 (EU10) and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 (EU2) . We denote the union of the two groups EU12, and EU8+2 whenever Cyprus and Malta are omitted. 2 Kahanec and Zimmermann (2010) . 3 Kahanec and Pytlikova (2013) .
3 asymmetrically affected countries and sectors in the European Union, struggling with exceptionally high unemployment rates in many EU member states. Whereas before the Great Recession many young workers from the new member states could have afforded ignoring the option of seeking employment abroad, or perceived it just as a luring option, during the crisis for many of them this option turned to be the only possibility of finding a job.
The migration response of the youth from the new member states to the changing economic conditions has not yet been well documented. And yet their response critically conditions the capacity of the European Union, and the European Monetary Union in particular, to absorb asymmetric economic shocks and thus the European integration project itself. Indeed, the long-run capacity of the European Union to deal with global economic challenges crucially depends on the degree of mobility of its labor force. In this regard, permanent moves help to absorb current economic disparities, but do not provide for increased capacity to absorb ensuing economic shocks. Temporary migration trajectories, on the other hand, provide for a labor force that is more responsive to economic fluctuations. On the background of aging populations, the temporal nature of youth mobility is of key importance from the perspective of the economic potential and welfare sustainability in the sending countries.
In the spirit of Hirschman (1970) , from the perspective of the sending countries, permanent out-migration of young people can be interpreted as an exit strategy driven by their frustration with the adverse labor market situation in the home country. We proceed as follows: Section 2 introduces the context of post-enlargement migration in the EU and briefly reviews the literature. Section 3 outlines the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 reports and interprets the result, and section 5 concludes. Many of these movers were young workers and students, who generally only had limited labor market experience, were singles and had no children. 10 As Figure 2 indicates, among migrants from the EU12 in the EU15 young people, aged 15 to 34, were overrepresented in most countries. As can be expected, the share of young people among migrants is significantly higher after 2004 when EU10 countries joined the EU in all the EU15 countries represented in Figure 2 . The largest increase in youth mobility was observed in the Netherlands, Austria, but also Greece, Denmark, and France.
[ Figure 1 around here]
[ Figure 2 around here]
Generally speaking these young cohorts of migrants were gender-balanced although female-bias emerged in some countries. Among young migrants after 2004 the highest 9 Kahanec, (2013b) . 10 Kahanec and Zimmermann, (2010) .
proportion of females were observed in Austria, France, Greece, and the Netherlands (See Figure 2) . On average post-enlargement migrants were well educated compared to the populations in the source but also destination countries (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2010; Kahanec, 2013b) .
[ Figure 3 around here]
The data and analytical framework
The analysis in this paper is based on data from Special Eurobarometer 337, wave 72. young residents of EU8+2 was gained and used as a basis for statistical inference.
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The key dependent variables were constructed using three questions from the intentions. Among Eastern Europeans who expressed intentions to work abroad in the future a majority also expressed preference for seeking a longer-term arrangement abroad, lasting for at least one year. Table 1 shows that the family situation strongly correlates with migration intentions.
Only about 22 per cent of married respondents with children reported intentions to move, while more than a half of singles 12 with no children foresaw themselves working in another EU member state. Married couples, regardless of whether with children or not, are less migration-prone than cohabiting couples, which were in turn less interested in migration than singles. Across these three categories, respondents with children were more likely to stay at home than childless members of their respective group. As far as the expected duration of migration experience is concerned, respondents with children are clustered in both "up to 1 year" and more than "5 years", while childless respondents seemed to be more open to medium-term migration.
[ Table 1 around here]
As concerns age, the younger the people are (within the 15-35 cohort) the more likely they are to expect moving abroad to work (See Figure 5 ). Only slightly more than 40 per cent of people under 18 signal no intentions to seek work abroad, while the corresponding figure for those aged between 30-35 is about 75 per cent. A similar pattern 10 emerges for the prevalence of expectations about stays abroad of long duration (more than 5 years), which also declines with age.
[ Figure 5 around here] Table 2 reveals that no straightforward patterns of relationship between education and migration expectations emerge, although students and those completing their education before their 16 th birthday appear to be more mobile.
[ Table 2 around here]
Finally, it is possible to identify three levels of migration propensity in relation with professional affiliation. At the top, the unemployed, just like students, are very prone to looking for work abroad, as about half of them intend to work abroad. In contrast, the self-employed individuals, non-managerial white collar workers and especially housepersons do not seem to be very mobile. Managers and manual workers are somewhere in between with about a third of them expecting working in another European country. These patterns are also visible for the expected duration of stay abroad, with students, the unemployed, and managers expecting longer-term commitments; whereas housepersons and the self-employed appear to have more temporary plans.
[ Table 3 around here]
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These descriptive statistics reveal a number of interesting patterns. Young male singles without children, still studying or with little education, or unemployed, appear to be most likely to expect future mobility. However, there may be more complex interactions among these variables, which may confound some of this descriptive inference. For example, age and student status are correlated, and simple statistics do not disentangle their independent effects on migration expectations. Other variables, such as having children, may have different effects for males and females.
To pinpoint and measure robust determinants of youth's migration intentions, we use binomial and ordered Logit models predicting the probability of expectations to move, and to move for longer durations. Among the key explanatory variables we include gender, age, professional and marital status, having children or not and educational attainment. These models disentangle conditional correlations among the studied variables and also enable us to look also at the interaction effects of gender and having children. The inclusion of country fixed effects controls for cross-sectional variation that invariably characterizes each country, including country-specific push factors.
Additionally, the dataset permits looking at the effects of a set of variables measuring subjective stance of respondents on various factors enhancing or limiting their propensity to migrate. These variables are listed in Table 4 . Including these variables in the analysis enables us to disentangle the effects of socio-demographic variables from perceived push and pull factors and constraints relevant for migration intentions of the youth in new member states.
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[ Table 4 around here]
The results
The results from binomial Logit regressions are reported in Table 5 . Among the positive factors for the intentions to move to another EEA country we identify not being married (whether single or cohabiting with a partner) and being a male with children. This finding and the insignificance of the coefficient with gender indicates that the correlation of gender and migration intentions arises through gendered response of households to the presence of children, and not as a direct effect of gender. The negative factors include age and working in a white-collar job. While upon inclusion of self-reported push and pull factors and constraints the latter effect disappears, the inclusion of push and pull factors and constraints does not qualitatively alter the results for the socio-demographic variables. Interestingly, education has essentially no effects on the intentions to work abroad.
A somewhat different picture emerges when it comes to expected duration of stay abroad for people intending to work abroad in the future. 13 Being a houseperson reduces the chance of expecting to stay abroad for at least five years; this effect is not present if we look at the intentions to stay permanently. Living with a partner as opposed to being married appears to reduce the probability of expecting duration of staying abroad of at least five years as well as, although to as smaller degree, to stay abroad permanently.
13
There is an indication of a similar negative effect on the intention to move permanently of being single. Remarkably, conditional on expecting to move, men with children expect shorter duration of stay, below five years. This may signify circular or seasonal migratory trajectories of male bread winners and, as mentioned above, a gendered response to the presence of children in the household. Interestingly, education gains importance, with more educated migrants (completing their education after their sixteenth birthday, i.e. not students or low educated) exhibiting a higher probability of expecting stays lasting for at least five years. This effect is not present, and perhaps even reverses, when it comes to intentions to move permanently. Generally, the inclusion of self-reported push and pull factors and constraints increases the precision and explanatory power of our regression models.
14 [ Table 5 around here]
It is interesting to observe that the effects of socio-demographic characteristics on migration expectations are rather independent of the considered self-reported pull and push factors and migration constraints. We report in Table 6 the coefficients for these factors corresponding to columns 4-6 in Table 5 . We observe that most of these factors Those who perceive the efforts needed to migrate as high, already have a good job, find it difficult to learn a new language, do not feel sufficiently qualified, perceive the cost of living abroad as high, or have strong emotional relationship to their home country tend to have a lower propensity to migrate.
[ Table 6 around here]
As the threshold of 5 years in the definition of Duration5 indicating long-term migratory intentions is arbitrary, we also considered an alternative measure with the duration threshold of 1 year. The results were essentially the same as reported in columns 2 and 5 of Table 5 . 15 We also test the robustness of our predictions using the ordered Logit model. The results reported in Table 7 are fully in line with those obtained from binomial Logit models above.
[ Table 7 around here]
Not reported, available upon request.
Conclusions and implications
In this paper we address the question of how did the youth in new EU member states respond to their newly acquired right to freely move for work within the European Union on the background of economic developments at the onset of the Great Recession. We
review the literature and descriptively analyze the EU LFS data from 2010 to find that the youth in the new member states has vigorously reacted to the (perspective of) accession of their countries to the European Union. Can these significant migration flows be considered as permanent, signifying exit from sending countries, or did the youth have just temporary migration plans, thus with their mobility decisions rather implicitly voicing their discontent with the socio-economic situation in their home countries?
To answer this question we studied migration intentions of the youth in new member states using the Eurobarometer 337, wave 72.5, database. We distinguished temporary and permanent migration intentions by looking at the expected duration of working abroad. Disentangling a number of interacting factors using a binomial Logit model, we find that the only variables that matter significantly in the statistical sense and thus have an independent effect on the probability of intentions to work abroad are age (negative), not being married, and having children if male (positive).
We further looked at the determinants of the expected duration of the intended working abroad. The analysis has shown that among the most loyal young people -i.e. not intending to stay abroad for more than 5 years -are housepersons, men with children, and those living with a partner (but not married). Those with completed education (if after their 16 th birthday) are more likely to report intentions to stay abroad more than five years, but less likely to report permanent migration intentions. Beyond the completion threshold the level of education however does not seem to matter much, indicating that, at least measured by intentions, there is little selection on formal education of migrants into temporary and longer or permanent migration plans.
The analysis of push and pull factors and migration constraints indicates that social, economic and political conditions abroad, as well as existing social networks abroad, all increase the propensity to indicate migratory intentions. Interestingly, the effect of the perception of better social and health care system abroad ends up only marginally significant, although there appears to be a small positive and statistically significant effect on permanent migratory intentions. On the other hand various constraints related to perceived costs of migration are very relevant factors that limit migration intentions.
Interestingly, when it comes to the desired duration of intended working abroad, among the youth most loyal to their home country, i.e. intending to return within five years after departure, are those who only want to discover something new or improve their qualifications, and who do not want to impose big changes on their family or children, or do not want to leave property behind. Those discontented with the political situation at home are considerably less loyal, however. Tables  Table 1. Intentions to Notes: Marginal effects from binomial Logit regressions of reported variables on the probability of expectations to move sometime in the future (Columns 1 and 4), stay there for at least 5 years (2 and 5), and stay there permanently (3 and 6). The excluded category is married male without children who still studies or completed his studies before his 16 th birthday. Notes: Marginal effects from binomial Logit regression models of reported variables on the probability of expectations to move sometime in the future (Column 4), stay there for at least 5 years (5), and stay there permanently (6) corresponding to the respective columns of Table 5 . N/A represents variables excluded due to less than 10 observations identifying the coefficient (the results in Table  5 are robust to exclusion or inclusion of such variables). Notes: Coefficients from ordered Logit regressions of reported variables on the probability of expectations to move and stay for less than a year, at least a year but less than five years, and more than five years (Columns 1 and 3). Columns 2 and 4 report the coefficient from a regression model excluding the category of stayers. The excluded category is married male without children who still studies or completed his studies before his 16 th birthday.
